Arrested in August 2024, Tang Yuanjun worked as a Ministry of State Security (MSS) asset between 2018 and 2023. He reported on the following categories of information:
1. Prominent U.S.-based Chinese democracy activists and dissidents.
2. US Chinese-American congressional candidate Xiong Yan.
3. Immigration claims and processes from Chinese dissidents seeking political asylum in the US.
In 2018, Tang expressed his desire to see his aging family in China. An acquaintance helped him establish secure online contact with an MSS officer. After being recruited, Tang reported to the MSS using a commercial email account, encrypted chats, text messages and audio and video calls. He helped the MSS infiltrate a group chat on WhatsApp; used by numerous PRC dissidents and pro-democracy activists to communicate about pro-democracy issues and express criticism of the PRC government. In fact, this was what users called a “super group”. It is a group that consists of many other groups. Members could not even identify who was the sponsor of the group chats.[1]
Tang also video-recorded a June 2020 Zoom discussion commemorating the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in the PRC. The Zoom online discussion was led by Zhou Fengsuo, Director of the June 4th Memorial Museum in New York City and a leading advocate for democracy in China. The Ministry of Public Security also infiltrated these discussions with the assistance from Zoom employees based in China and the US.[2]
Tang was Secretary General of the overseas headquarters of the China Democratic Party United Headquarters in New York City. This non-profit organization assisted mainland Chinese dissidents in immigration and asylum applications for the US. Tang provided information on these individuals to the MSS.[3] Tang also identified ten immigration attorneys to support MSS efforts to place assets in the US. Other dissident organizations in New York and Los Angeles provide similar visa application services to generate income.
In 2022, Tang met with the MSS in Changchun City, Jilin Province, China, where an officer installed a software on Tang’s phone. The software uploaded was commercial , and uploaded all photographs and videos captured on the phone to the cloud. The MSS had access to that cloud account. In his role as leading democracy advocate, Tang encouraged dissidents to attend protests in Manhattan and Washington DC. He used the compromised phone to take photographs of the events. The CCP then used the photos as evidence against overseas dissidents.
On at least three occasions, Tang met with MSS officers in Macau or mainland China. Each time he traveled through intermediary countries to hide his travel to China. In January 2019, Tang traveled to Macau through Taipei, Taiwan; in April 2022, Tang traveled to mainland China through Incheon, South Korea; and in April 2023, Tang again traveled to Macau through Taipei. A prominent dissident such as Tang would not be able to travel to China without being arrested, unless his travel was approved by authorities.
The MSS administered a polygraph exam to Tang prior to discussing operational activities. Tang then provided the MSS information about specific PRC dissidents, including the information captured from one of Tang’s phones. Still, some US based dissidents became suspicious of Tang when he traveled through the region and began making contradictory statements about the democracy effort and the CCP regime.
Status: Alleged
Tradecraft
The MSS exploited Tang’s emotional bonds to his family to recruit him.
The MSS paid Tang in cash but that was not the motivating factor in his recruitment.
Tang was provided an email account and passcode to begin communicating with the MSS.
Tang traveled through intermediary countries to hide his travel to China.
The MSS communicated with Tang using phone calls, video calls, audio messages, text and draft email messages.
The MSS installed specialized software on Tang’s cellphone designed to send data including conversations and photos.
Tang communicated with the MSS using a shared commercial video account.
MSS used polygraph examinations in China to validate the asset. Note - this is the first time this tradecraft has been seen (publicly).
The MSS and the Ministry of Public Security coordinated their online infiltration of Chinese dissident groups operating in the US.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Discussion with member dissident organizations, 8/26/2024
[2] US Department of Justice, US vs. Xinjiang “Julien” Jin. Case: 1:20-mj-01103-RER. 2020
[3] Dissidents interviewed for this report say that the MSS exploits some democracy associations in New York and Los Angeles to identify dissidents attempting to flee China. In addition, the MSS exploits compromised dissident organizations by inserting recruited assets in that visa application process.
Comentarios